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GUNs, ORIGINALISM, AND CULTURAL COGNITION

Jamal Greene
"Ofcourse, the risk of assessing evolving standardsis that it is all too easy
to believe that evolution has culminated in one's own views. '

In a legal regime whose canonical text is Marbury v. Madison,2 it
should be unremarkable that the Supreme Court's actions are
bounded rather severely by public opinion. What makes the proposition remarkable-enough to be well worth Barry Friedman's time is also what makes Marbury remarkable: namely, that judges so often
go out of their way to deny it. Though not unheard of, it is rare for a
judge to advertise that the content of a constitutional rule she is announcing is motivated by public opinion. Such an admission would
be self-defeating, since it invites the charge that she has stepped outside of her role. If public opinion determines the content of constitutional rules, then it is more difficult to defend our collective choice
of judges rather than politicians or social scientists as constitutional
caretakers.
The notion that judges legitimately respond to public opinion is a
particularly difficult concession for those who deny that the meaning
of the Constitution evolves over time. If Friedman's hypothesis is
correct, it seems to put such judges to an uncomfortable choice between self-denial and public deception, between turning "fainthearted" or being disingenuous. One faced with a professed inter-

I
2

Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Bert Huang, Nathaniel Persily, Amy Semet, and participants at the Princeton University Constitutional Law Advanced Workshop for comments on earlier drafts. Amy Semet and Vishal Agraharkar
provided outstanding research assistance.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,865 (1988) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

3

BARRY FREIDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE

4

Justice Scalia has famously called himself a "faint-hearted" originalist, based both on his
commitment to stare decisis and on his presumed reluctance to adhere to an original
understanding that conflicted diametrically with contemporary values. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 861-64 (1989) ("I cannot imagine
myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging."). At least one prominent originalist scholar has argued that Scalia's
originalism is undeserving of the label. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Gritique

*

SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
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pretivist whose rulings appear to track evolving public opinion is
tempted to invoke Judge Larry Fidler's exasperated plea to SaraJane
Olson: "Were you lying to me then or are you lying to me now?"'
This brief article seeks to resist the temptation in the particular
context of originalism and gun rights. When the Supreme Court
held in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to carry a handgun for self-defense, the longstanding marriage between guns and originalism was finally consummated. The majority's unapologetic devotion to originalism has
been well-documented. On its face, Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court rests on a contested assumption about interpretation that he
has spent much of his public life defending: namely, that the original
meaning of constitutional text controls modern interpretation, even
if that meaning has come unmoored from the purpose behind codification or is inconsistent with contemporary public values. Since the
Second Amendment declares its ends in its preamble-"A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State"8-the Heller Court's disregard of purpose in favor of original meaning could
not have been more transparent.9
At the same time, Heller was consistent with the prevailing political
winds. A CNN poll conducted three weeks before the decision was
announced found that two-thirds of Americans believed that the language of the Second Amendment protects an individual right to own
a gun rather than a collective right to form a militia.'o A more recent

5
6
7

8

9

10

of "Faint-Hearted"Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13 (2006) (concluding that "Justice
Scalia is simply not an originalist").
Anna Gorman, OLven's Attempt to Change Plea Fails, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at 1.
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
SeeJamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. LJ. 657, 682-89 (2009) (discussing use of
originalism in Heller); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as PopularConstitutionalism
in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 191 (2008) (noting that many have viewed Heller as "the
'Triumph of Originalism'");J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling
Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 256-57 (2009) ("Whereas once legal conservatism demanded that judges justify decisions by reference to a number of restraining principles,
Heller requires that they only make originalist arguments supporting their preferred
view.").
U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
See Randy E. Barnett, News Rash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27,
2008, at A13 (calling Heller "the finest example of what is now called 'original public
meaning' jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court."). But see Nelson Lund, The
Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalistjuriprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1345
(2009) ("[T]he Court's reasoning is at critical points so defective-and in some respects
so transparently non-originalist-that Heller should be seen as an embarrassment for
those who joined the majority opinion.").
CNN/Opinion
Research
Corp.
Poll,
June
4-5,
2008,
available at
http://www.pollingreport.com/guns.htm.
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survey conducted by Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily, and
me in July 2009 found that 82 percent of Americans agreed (and 52
percent "strongly" agreed) that an individual should have a right to
keep a registered handgun at home." The Court's decision earned
the endorsement of both major Presidential candidates at the time,
and the majority opinion, conspicuously and without explanation,
exempted some of the most popular gun control laws from its reach. 3
For those reasons, it is tempting simply to regard Heller as further
proof of Robert Dahl's enduring thesis-recently updated by Friedman-that "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking
majorities of the United States." 4 On this account, dressing the Heller
opinion in historical garb is but one of many possible legitimation
strategies that the Court regularly employs to sustain the illusion of a
divide between law and politics.
We need not abandon this account, or the insights of positive political science more generally, in order to pose interesting questions
about the Court's choice of methodology. An originalist opinion was
not the only possible route to Heller's holding, and it may not even
have been the most persuasive one. The fear animating the Second
Amendment at its inception was not overly aggressive crime control
by the federal government, but rather federal displacement of state
militias.' It is true that, as Justice Scalia recognized in Heller, and as
the Court held last Term in McDonald v. City of Chicago,6 the Second
Amendment was widely conceptualized in individual-right terms by
11

See KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS, FIELD REPORT:
(2010) (on file with author).

12

See Mike Dorning, Obama Hedges on Gun Ruling: Republicans Accuse Candidateof "Flip-fRop,"

13

CHI. TRIB.,June 27, 2008, at 20 (reporting John McCain's response that the ruling was "a
landmark victory for 2nd Amendment freedom" and Barack Obama's statement that he
has "always believed that the 2nd Amendment protects the right of individuals to bear
arms") (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008) ("[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.").

14

15

16

CONSTITUTIONAL ATTITUDES SURVEY 58

Robert A. Dahi, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker, 6J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957); cf FRIEDMAN, supra, note 3. But see PUBLIC OPINION

AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (chronicling the
disparity between public opinion and Supreme Court decisions in a range of areas).
See David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing TransatlanticContext for the Historical Meaning of "the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms," 22 L. & HIsT. REV. 119, 142
(2004) (discussing the fear of who would staff and control state militias present in state
ratifying conventions and in Congress).
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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the dawn of the Civil War.1 7 But the Heller majority's effort to describe
the Second Amendment in those terms as of 1791 was anachronistic
and put considerable strain on the Court's reasoning. Of course, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are both on record as advocating an
originalist interpretive approach, and so Hellerwas not an obvious occasion to abandon it, but the other three Justices in the majority are
not originalists. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, or (most readily)
Justice Kennedy could have acknowledged without embarrassment
that their reading of the Second Amendment derived from an evolution in constitutional values.' Yet Roberts declined to assign the majority opinion to a nonoriginalist, and none of the Justices in the majority wrote separately to express disagreement with any aspect of
Justice Scalia's opinion.
This Article argues that originalism's stubborn hold on pro-gun
rights arguments may not be direct, but may instead result in part
from a shared cultural orientation between originalist and gun rights
proponents. That is, the appeal of deploying originalist arguments to
establish a right to carry a gun may not derive from an independently
persuasive account of the history of the Second Amendment. Rather,
I suggest, the appeal of originalist arguments in this context derives
in part from the shared cultural values of those to whom both originalist and gun rights arguments appeal. The cultural orientation that
predicts attitudes in favor of gun rights significantly overlaps with the
one that predicts attitudes in favor of originalism. The complex political process through which both gun rights and originalism have
been pitched to the American public over the last quarter century has
accordingly availed itself of a bond between the two sets of ideas that
resists empirical deconstruction. Originalism is the preferred methodology, not because it supplies the best arguments, a priori, in favor
of constitutional gun rights, but because it supplies the most resonant
interpretive language through which gun rights proponents discuss
the Constitution.

17

See id. at 3038 ("By the 1850's, the perceived threat that had prompted the inclusion of
the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights-the fear that the National Government would
disarm the universal militia-had largely faded as a popular concern, but the right to
keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of self-defense."); Heller, 128 S. Ct. at
2807 ("The 19th-century cases that interpreted the Second Amendment universally support an individual right unconnected to militia service."); David B. Kopel, The Second
Amendment in the Nineteenth Centmy, 1998 BYU L. RFV. 1359, 1447-54 (1998)

(noting

statements of this time period referred to the Second Amendment as an individual right).
18

SeeJamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV.
325, 341-42 (2009) (stating that neither ChiefJustice Roberts norJustice Alito has demonstrated strong originalist tendencies).
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My argument draws primarily on two bodies of research. First is
the work of Dan Kahan and Donald Braman applying cultural theory
to the debate over gun control. Kahan and Braman have argued in a
series of articles that individual support for or opposition to gun control is motivated by differences in cultural worldviews.'9 To wit, individuals holding hierarchical and individualistic worldviews are far
more likely to oppose gun control than individuals with respectively
contrasting worldviews. Kahan and Braman argue further that the
contribution of cultural orientation to policy views is such that individuals will inevitably evaluate relevant empirical evidence in accordance with, rather than independent of, those orientations.o One
need not adopt the strong position-apparently endorsed by Kahan
and Braman-that culture is entirely prior to empirical observation
to believe, as I will argue, that the link between gun rights and originalism is difficult to break through even the most conscientious historical argument.
The second body of work I draw upon is the original survey research referenced earlier. In a series of surveys conducted in July
2009 and in June and July 2010, Ansolabehere, Persily, and I asked
Americans about their views on constitutional interpretation, on specific constitutional issues, and on social and cultural questions. Our
findings are reported more fully in a separate article 2 ' but as relevant
here we found that morally traditionalist and libertarian cultural orientations were highly significant predictors of a belief in originalism,
predictive at higher confidence levels and yielding larger standardized coefficients than party identification, race, gender, or education
level. In light of these findings, it seems that divorcing the gun rights
argument from originalism may require much more than a history
lesson.

19

20

21

See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of
Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1292 (2003) (discussing the influence of individuals' cultural worldviews on their positions on gun control). Much of Kahan and
Braman's work in this area is compiled at The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law
School, availableat http://www.culturalcognition.net.
See id.; see also Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts,
Culture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 Soc. J. RES. 283, 285 (2005) ("Through an
overlapping set of psychological and cultural mechanisms, individuals adopt the factual
beliefs that are dominant among persons who share their cultural orientations.").
SeeJamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript on file with author).
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I
Cultural theorists believe that individual perceptions of risk are
based largely on individual cultural worldviews. Culturally contingent
moral presuppositions shape our assessment of which among competing sets of risks deserve our consideration and attention. In their
landmark study, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky theorized that
human culture is differentiated primarily along two dimensions: a
"group" dimension that reports relative levels of normative affinity for
collective moral pressure, and a "grid" dimension that reports one's
relative comfort with prescriptive social classification. If we view each
dimension as binary, we can identify four ideal types of cultural orientation: low group, low grid ("individualists"); low group, high grid
("fatalists"); high group, low grid ("egalitarian"); and high group,
high grid ("hierarchical").22
Individualists are libertarian and unsentimental, favoring robust
competition over resources between diverse individuals unregulated
either by central planning authority or prescriptive social norms.
The fatalist cedes the enforcement of social norms across fixed status
categories but resists group solidarity or identification. The egalitarian seeks to minimize differences in distributive outcomes, which
might require strong government in the economic and political
realm, but wishes to maximize opportunities for individual flourishing in the face of competing social norms, which might require weak
government in the realm of public morality. The hierarchicallyoriented, by contrast, is deferential to order and authority, both political and social. Roughly, egalitarian and hierarchical orientations
differ across the dimension of social ordering (favoring economic
and political ordering), and individualistic and fatalistic orientations
differ across the dimension of economic and political ordering (opposing social ordering).
Kahan and Braman have spent the better part of a decade applying the cultural theory of risk to individual views on gun control.
Drawing on the work.of Douglas and Wildavsky, Karl Dake," Ellen Pe-

22

MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982) (discussing individuals' capabili-

ties for assessing risk).
23

Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61, 62 (1999) (arguing that

mental models of risk are not solely matters of individual cognition, but also correspond
to worldviews entailing deeply held beliefs and values regarding society, its functioning,
and its potential fate).
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ters, and Paul Slovic, 2 4 and on their own statistical analysis based on
General Social Survey (GSS) data from 1988-2000, Kahan and Braman conclude that egalitarian and "solidaristic"25 worldviews predict
support for gun control, while hierarchical and individualistic worldviews predict opposition to gun control.26 This is consistent with
many of our intuitions and with Kahan and Braman's predicted results. In the American psyche, guns are symbols of masculinity and
honor. For many, guns also connote state regulation of social nonconformists and "out" groups through violence both public-military
and police forces-and private-lynchings, domestic violence, and
hate crimes. At the same time, American gun culture valorizes selfreliance, as it is associated with hunting, with local as against federal
authority, and with protection of home and hearth more generally.
Our own research suggests (though with some notable ambiguity)
that individuals who generally express satisfaction with the current
level of equality in society and who believe in limited government are
more likely to favor individual gun rights, controlling for demographic variation.
Standing alone, then, Kahan and Braman's findings are not wildly
controversial. They leverage their observations into the more provocative claim, however, that cultural commitments precede and, indeed, commandeer data-based judgments about risk to such a degree
that facts cannot change minds about gun control. This is in part because facts have the perverse, and exclusive, effect of reinforcing the
views of those who need no convincing: "While predictably failing to
change anyone's mind, empirical analyses do reinforce the conviction
of those who already accept their conclusions that a rational and just

24

25

26

Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the
Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26.1. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1427, 1428 (1996)

(noting that a person's "affective reaction" to a risk influences their cognitive perception
of the risk).
Kahan and Braman use "solidaristic" rather than "fatalist," presumably because it better
resonates and because they wish to emphasize the "group" dimension along which the
individualist-solidaristic scale varies. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 18, at 1291.
It is important to note that Kahan and Braman's study designs coded responses along two
distinct scales: a hierarchy-egalitarianism scale and an individualism-solidarism scale, the
first roughly measuring views on social ordering and the second measuring views on political and economic ordering. Their results suggest that we can expect those who favor
social ordering, ceteris paribus, to favor gun rights, and those who favor political and economic ordering, ceteris paribus, to favor gun control. As I understand Kahan and Braman's study, then, hierarchists might be more likely than egalitarians to oppose gun control, but we cannot say whether they are more or less likely to favor it than solidarists or
individualists. For my purposes, this nomenclature is less important than the method
through which populations are identified. See id.
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assessment of the facts must support their position."7 Kahan and
Braman's data-driven (and therefore ironic) skepticism about the
utility of empirical facts in resolving normative debate has prompted
intense criticism which they have on various occasions sought to re-

but.28 For now, my concern is not with their thesis in its strongest variation. Let it suffice for our purposes that our cultural orientations
will cause us to resist historical or social facts that point towards a
competing risk assessment. This intuition is consistent with familiar
accounts of cognitive dissonance. 9
II
Judicial review is risky business. Constitutional theorists do not
customarily describe the various modalities of interpretation in terms
of competing bundles of risk, but they might. Judicial review in the
United States entails a delegation of decision-making authority over
constitutive matters of political life to elites who enjoy effective life
tenure, who do not stand for election, and who purport to be guided
by a two centuries-old document. Consider two possible approaches
to interpretation of unclear constitutional language within such a regime. Under the first approach, a judge considers herself constrained by the set of applications that a learned man at the time of
ratification would reasonably have ascribed to the text in his own
time. Under the second approach, the judge considers herself bound
by the principles immanent within the text and must apply them dynamically, as her own assessment of their modern application directs.

27

28

29

Kahan & Braman, supra note 19, at 1321.
See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Fact-Free Gun Policy?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1329
(2003) (arguing that while cultural worldviews may influence individuals' feelings about
gun control, so does evidence on consequences of gun use); Gertrud M. Fremling &John
R. Lott, Jr., The SurprisingFinding that "CulturalWorldviews" Don't Explain People's Views on
Gun Control, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (2003) (arguing that facts and evidence, in addition to cultural worldviews, affect individuals' feelings about gun control); David B.
Mustard, Culture Affects Our Beliefs About Firearms, But DataAre Also Important, 151 U. PA. L.
REv. 1387, 1387 (2003) (arguing that data as well as culture affect beliefs about firearms).
But cf Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Caught in the Crossfire: A Defense of the Cultural
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1395, 1396 (2003) (responding to critics'
emphasis on the importance of data in determining gun-control opinions by reemphasizing the importance of cultural worldviews); Braman, Kahan & Grimmelmann, supra note
19.
See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3 (1957) (arguing that cognitive dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable and will motivate an individual to reduce
dissonance and achieve consonance, and that cognitive dissonance will lead to individuals
avoiding situations and information which will likely increase the dissonance).
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The risks attending each approach are familiar. Under the first
approach, there are linguistic difficulties with ascertaining the meaning of text to fictional individuals in an age before American dictionaries. There are public choice problems of distilling collective motivations, intentions, and understandings into pronouncements
featuring the certitude required of legal authority. Not least, identifying constitutional meaning with the views of slaveholders and of men
who otherwise held women, Indian tribes, and commoners in low regard can (to understate) be alienating. Under the second approach,
however, elite values risk supplanting public values and may depend
as much on the various and shifting commitments of the swingJustice
as on those of any democratically responsible institution. These bundles of risk are not randomly appreciated;they will be differentially
salient across the population, and we have every reason to suspect
they are driven by culture.
We can go some way towards demonstrating that empirically. We
asked several originalism-related questions in our surveys. For example, we asked the following, which duplicates a series of questions
asked by the Quinnipiac Polling Institute from 2003 to 2008, and
again in 2010: "Which comes closer to your point of view? 1) In
making decisions, the Supreme Court should only consider the original intentions of the authors of the Constitution; 2) In making decisions, the Supreme Court should consider changing times and current realities in applying the principles of the Constitution." In order
to mitigate any anomalies resulting from the wording of that question, however, we also asked, for example, whether "[t]he Supreme
Court should focus less on what the Constitution meant when it was
written and more on the affect its decisions will have in today's America," and whether "[t]he Supreme Court should read the Constitution as a general set of principles whose meaning changes over
time., 0 We used principal component factor analysis to construct an
index that roughly measures one's degree of affinity for originalism.
This index then became our dependent variable of greatest interest.
One might lodge a familiar objection to our survey results, and to
survey data on popular attitudes towards courts more generally. It is
clear that most Americans devote little attention to courts most of the
time, and it would be surprising indeed to learn that phrases like
"original intentions" register more than a superficial degree of com-

30

Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 21 (manuscript at 9).
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prehension for most Americans.' We take this objection not to be
that Americans do not understand what they are being asked, but rather that they do not understand what follows from their answers.
That is, ordinary citizens appreciate the conceptual distinction between the options posed but lack the epistemic tools to cash out what
their answers portend substantively. If, as it is reasonable to suppose,
people care about substantive constitutional outcomes at least as
much as they do methodology, then one might conclude that responses may easily be manipulated through substantive framing.
How would results change, for example, were we to reveal to respondents that the framers of the Equal Protection Clause were comfortable with affirmative action but uncomfortable with gender equality
or integrated public schools?
We take up this objection at greater length in our fuller treatment
of these data. The use of factor analysis reduces framing effects that
might be particular to a question's wording. More broadly, the
strength of the criticism depends on the use to which one wishes to
put the data. I do not believe we could responsibly use our study as
proof, or even as reliable evidence, that more Americans agree with
Justice Breyer than with Justice Scalia on constitutional interpretation, or even that a substantial number of Americans agree with either. The question they or other informed lawyers or academics are
answering is different than the one most people are answering. We
take as a starting point that most respondents do not appreciate the
implications of their answer for the substantive decisionmaking of the
Supreme Court. Nor do we assume, however, that a particular choice
of methodology-particularly at the level of generality of our studyhas any necessary implications for substantive constitutional decisionmaking. Our hypothesis is that methodological choices are salient within the public consciousness, and that rhetoric about methodology is a political commodity;33 our modest aim is to assess how
31

See generally MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & ScoTr KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNow ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62-104 (1996) (arguing that what Americans know about
politics involves a complicated set of questions and answers); Frederick Schauer, The Su-

preme Court 2005

Term, Foreword: The Court'sAgenda-and the Nation's, 120 HARV. L. REv. 4,

12-32 (2006) (cataloging the large conceptual distance between the public agenda and
the agenda of the Supreme Court). But seeJAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA,
CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIvrlY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE

32

33

AMERICAN PEOPLE 17 (2009) (arguing that the evidence of public ignorance about courts
is weak).
The number of people answering "don't know" to the Quinnipac questions was consistently in the single digits. See Greene, Persily, & Ansolabehere, supra note 21 (manuscript
at 7). This is probative of, though not identical to, salience.
See generally Greene, supra note 7.
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the responses triggered by those choices differ across demographic
and cultural space. 31
In order to identify the cultural orientations of our respondents,
we replicated a series of "values" questions that have been asked in
the American National Elections Studies. Six of the questions probed
views on relative levels of equality; four spoke to moral traditionalism;
and three pairs of options explored views on the appropriate size of
government. Using factor analysis, we developed three indices: an
"egalitarian" index, a "moral traditionalism" index, and a "government size" index. Our basic model is an ordinary least squares regression with the originalism index as the dependent variable. 6 The
model includes a number of standard demographic variables, in addition to views on specific issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage,
and gun rights.3 1
Our moral traditionalism factor and our government size factor
were both significant at the .05 level. The moral traditionalism index
also produced one of our largest standardized coefficients, suggesting
not only confidence in its significance but substantive effects of a relatively large magnitude. Our egalitarianism factors did not achieve
**
38
significance.
Several theoretical explanations might support the moral traditionalism result. Most obviously, moral traditionalists resist accommodation of changes in moral standards, a risk obviated by adherence to original intentions and exacerbated by permitting social elites
to adjust the Constitution to "changing times and current realities."
Less obviously, perhaps, moral traditionalists may be less likely than
their opposites to be skeptical of claims of absolute truth or to accept
pluralism. That attitude might plausibly affect not only their views of
morality but also their views of language. The notion that the same
language can have radically different and yet equally valid meanings
for different people at the same time may be harder to swallow for
those with hierarchical rather than egalitarian orientations.
It is more difficult to say with confidence why libertarians would
tend towards originalism, but at least two possibilities recommend
34

35
36

37
38

We would also note that the cognitive objection is not limited to questions about courts,
but could be lodged as to virtually any complex policy view. The efficacy of push polling,
for example, does not mean that political polling is useless for all purposes, or even for its
most useful purpose (predicting election results).
See infra Appendix A.
Logistic regression analysis generates similar patterns of significance, but does not permit
use of an agreed-upon standardization of coefficients.
F-tests were used to test the joint insignificance of omitted variables.
Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 21 (manuscript at 37-38).
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themselves. First, originalism and libertarianism are both expressively linked to constitutional valorization. Glorifying the Constitution is not a conceptual requirement of either libertarianism or
originalism, but both conventionally associate themselves with the
document and celebrate its fundamental goodness. Second, an orientation towards self-reliance might lead one to regard deference to
the value choices of elites with suspicion. Libertarianism and democracy are sometimes thought to be opposed, as in discussions of the
countermajoritarian dilemma, but there is a strand of American liber-

tarianism that better resembles localism. Indeed, our governmentsize questions are more likely to tease out this orientation than conventional libertarianism. The government-size factor identifies those
who would rather political and social authority rest with local insiders
than with elite outsiders. Limiting the Constitution to its original expectations is a means of retaining popular control over political decisionmaking. As Robert Bork writes, "the attempt to adhere to the
principles actually laid down in the historic Constitution will mean
that entire ranges of problems and issues are placed off-limits for

judges. 40
III
As others have remarked, the proliferation of originalist arguments in favor of an individual rights view of the Second Amendment
is a genuine paradox in light of the relative strength of nonoriginalist arguments supporting the same position.4 justice Scalia
concedes, after all, that the purpose behind the Second Amendment
was not to bolster or recognize an individual right to personal selfdefense, but to ensure the availability of state militias.4 ' And those
militias were threatened not because the federal government might
be overzealous about crime control, but because the new Constitution granted Congress the power "to provide for organizing, arming

39
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SeeJamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1, 63-64 (2009) (discussing
how originalism is in part a product of the degree to which Americans revere the drafters
of the Constitution).
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUIiON OF THE LAW 163
(1990).

41

See Saul Cornell, The Ironic Second Amendment, I ALB. GoV'T L. REv. 292, 294-95 (2008)

42

(arguing that a living constitution view of the Second Amendment, rather than an originalist view, lends the most support to an individual rights position).
See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008) (recognizing that the Second
Amendment's preamble "announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to
prevent elimination of the militia").
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and disciplining the militia."4 3 Remarkably few contemporaneous
statements during the ratifying period for the Constitution or for the
Bill of Rights suggest that anyone of consequence believed the American people were raising to constitutional heights an individual right
to personal self-defense.
By contrast, it is eminently reasonable to infer that the right had
reached those heights by the time of the Civil War. To cite but one of
many possible data points, in his floor statement introducing the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate, Jacob Howard declared that
section one of the Amendment was designed to apply against the
states "the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight
amendments of the Constitution; such as . .. the right to keep and
bear arms."" Last term, the Supreme Court relied on that and other
evidence to hold that the Second Amendment is incorporated against
state governments.4 5 Second Amendment incorporation would have
been conceptually awkward at the founding, as the Amendment was
designed to protect state prerogatives, but it was no longer odd by
Reconstruction. Since it is unthinkable within our contemporary
constitutional culture that most individual rights could bind state
governments but not the federal government, it is sensible for nonoriginalists to consider Heller's outcome perfectly justifiable as of
1868. And although the Court had never before Heller invalidated a
gun control regulation on Second Amendment grounds, the individual rights view simpliciterwas and remains extremely popular, and the
District of Columbia's handgun ban was widely viewed as the strictest
ordinance in the Nation. There is ample fodder for an opinion stating that, whatever one's view of the founding era, the Second
Amendment has become an individual right-protecting provision that
the Supreme Court must respect as such.
Yet originalism has retained its hold on the Second Amendment,
and Chief Justice Roberts assigned the Heller opinion to the Court's
most notorious originalist.1 One can easily imagine at least two po-
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U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., IST SESS. 2765-66 (May 23, 1866).
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See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3033 n.9 (2010) (citing statements by
Howard, John Bingham, and Thaddeus Stevens to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment was contemporaneously understood as incorporating the Bill of Rights).
Cf Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (arguing that constitutional interpretation "must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of
what was said [during the framing era]").
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See Sanford Levinson, Why Didn't the Supreme Court Take My Advice in the Heller Case? Some
Speculative Iesponses to an Egocentric Question, 60 HASTINGS LJ. 1491, 1500-02 (2009)
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tential analytic progressions that might lead to a marriage of gun
rights and originalism. The first progression goes: (1) originalism is
the correct approach to constitutional interpretation; and (2) an originalist approach leads to the individual rights view; and therefore
(3) the individual rights view is correct. This is the idealized progression of legal analysis, and I have already suggested that it is suspect
standing alone. A second progression goes: (1) the individual rights
view is normatively desirable; and (2) an originalist approach leads to
the individual rights view; therefore, (3) originalism is correct. This
is the idealized progression of much political science analysis, and
again, I have suggested that it is suspect standing alone.
This paper suggests a third progression. Although our coding
does not overlap precisely with that of Kahan and Braman-and indeed theirs does not map onto that of other cultural theorists 48 -the
originalists in our sample have remarkably similar profiles to the gunrights proponents in theirs. Kahan and Braman identify those with
egalitarian and hierarchical orientations as most likely to oppose gun
control. The GSS questions Kahan and Braman used to place respondents on their hierarchy-egalitarian scale are likely to identify
moral traditionalists and libertarians as much as it is those who believe in equality as it is conventionally understood and discussed. The
six questions asked about views on the death penalty, interracial marriage, same-sex intimacy, belief in traditional gender roles, and the
appropriate levels of government spending on (1) "[i]mproving the
conditions of Blacks" and (2) "[t]he military, armaments, and defense."49 The GSS questions Kahan and Braman used to identify individualists, which probed views on the appropriate levels of government spending on a number of other public goods, are also likely to
capture a similar population to those who score highly libertarian on
our government size index.
Consider, then, the following progression: (1) I have a morally
traditionalist or libertarian/localist orientation; and therefore (2)
originalism is the correct approach to constitutional interpretation
and the individual rights view is normatively desirable; and therefore
(3) it is difficult to countenance an argument that originalism does

48
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(wondering why ChiefJustice Roberts chose an originalist to write such an important and
potentially divisive opinion).
See Mary Douglas, Being Fair to Hierarchists,151 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1349 (2003) (critiquing the use of cultural theory of risk to analyze public opinion on gun control because of
the difficulties in excluding bias in developing a survey that is intended to demonstrate
individual attitudes towards gun control).
Kahan & Braman, supra note 19, app. at 1326.
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not support the individual rights view or that gun rights are better
justified under a different approach. This progression identifies a
kind of moral traditionalism or libertarianism as an omitted variable
that leads the decider to support both originalism and gun rights,
and recruits an account of cognitive dissonance to explain why the
two go hand-in-hand. It neither adopts wholesale the fictions of traditional legal analysis, nor assumes any bad faith on the part of participants in legal debate. Under this approach, originalist supporters
of the individual rights view may experience their arguments-which
are not independently persuasive-as having legal integrity (as may
non-originalist opponents of the individual rights view).
Participants within the conservative legal movement have, through
their rhetoric, powerfully reinforced the underlying connection between gun rights and originalism. In a 1997 speech, Charlton Heston
told gun owners:
You are a casualty of the cultural warfare being waged against traditional American freedom of beliefs and ideas.... Rank-and-file Americans wake up every morning, increasingly bewildered and confused at
why their views make them lesser citizens. After enough breakfast-table
TV promos hyping tattooed sex-slaves on the next Rikki Lake show,
enough gun-glutted movies and tabloid talk shows, enough revisionist
history books and prime-time ridicule of religion, enough of the TV anchor who cocks her pretty head, clucks her tongue and sighs about guns
causing crime and finally the message gets through: Heaven help the
God-fearing, law-abiding, Caucasian, middle class, Protestant, or-even
worse-NRA-card-carrying, average working stiff, or-even worse-male
working stiff, because not only don't you count, you're a downright obstacle to social progress....
Although my years are long, I was not on hand to help pen the Bill of
Rights. And popular assumptions aside, the same goes for the Ten
Commandments. Yet as an American and as a man who believes in God's
almighty power, I treasure both.
The Constitution was handed down to guide us by a bunch of those
wise old dead white guys who invented this country. Now, some flinch
when I say that. Why? It's true . . . they were white guys. So were most of
the guys who died in Lincoln's name opposing slavery in the 1860s. So
why should I be ashamed of white guys? Why is 'Hispanic pride' or 'black
pride' a good thing, while 'white pride' conjures up shaved heads and
white hoods? Why was the Million Man March on Washington celebrated
in the media as progress, while the Promise Keepers March on Washington was greeted with suspicion and ridicule? I'll tell you why: cultural
warfare....
Mainstream America is depending on you-counting on you-to
draw your sword and fight for them. These people have precious little
time or resources to battle misguided Cinderella attitudes, the fringe
propaganda of the homosexual coalition, the feminists who preach that
it's a divine duty for women to hate men, blacks who raise a militant fist
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with one hand while they seek preference with the other, and all the
New-Age apologists for juvenile crime, who see roving gangs as a means
of adolescent merchandising, violence as a form of entertainment for
impressionable minds, and gun bans as a means to lord-knows-what.
We've reached that point in time when our national social policy originates on Oprah. I say it's time to pull the plug!"
I have quoted at some length, but even a snippet would have sufficed to get a flavor for the overriding themes: traditional morality;
Christianity; race; crime-control; gender roles; anti-elitism; victimhood; self-reliance; and "rank-and-file" Americans. Heston does not,
of course, speak for all gun rights proponents or all originalists. But
his speech is emblematic of the message, at times subliminal and at
times more overt, thatjoins these communities at the hip.
When we recognize originalism as an expressive idiom as much as
a methodology, we can better predict its archetypal (though by no
means exclusive) speakers. They are traditionalists, comfortable with
inherited social stratification and suspicious of the efforts of elites
both inside and outside of government to alter it. They associate deconstruction and relativism with destruction of a successful social order and loss of moral grounding. They disdain loose morals and
condescension in equal measure.
CONCLUSION

This paper has offered, briefly, the end of a story, not the beginning. Culture is not exogenous to the political and social movements
that affiliate with and make use of it. Linking a professional practice
like originalism to a matrix of expressive values is work and requires a
degree of agency. I have sought to expose the dynamics of one particular reconciliation of typically conservative instincts towards forms
of constitutional originalism with Friedman's claim that the Court
generally responds to public opinion. Public opinion may not only
create the need for a legitimation strategy, but it may substantively
engage and shape the strategy itself. The cultural orientation that social and political organizers tap into in promoting gun rights is similar to the one "methodological" entrepreneurs tap into in promoting
originalism. Over time, the two outcomes may become pervasively

linked in the public mind, not to mention the judicial one. Whether
or not an originalist justification for individual gun rights is the best

50

Charlton Heston, First Vice President, National Rifle Association, Speech at the Free
Congress Foundation's 20th Anniversary Gala (Dec. 7, 1997), available at
http://www.vpc.org/nrainfo/speech.html.
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one, it may have been the only one the Heler majority could experience as true.
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APPENDIX

The "equality" questions recorded levels of agreement with each
of the following propositions:
* Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that
everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.
* We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.
* One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give
everyone an equal chance.
* This country would be better off if we worried less about how
equal people are.
* It is not really a big problem if some people have more of a
chance in life than others.
* If people were treated more equally in this country we would
have many fewer problems.
The "moral traditionalism" questions recorded levels of agreement
with each of the following propositions:
* The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of
moral behavior to those changes.
* The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our
society.
* We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.
The three pairs of "government size" questions were as follows:
* The main reason government has become bigger over the
years is because it has gotten involved in things that people
should do for themselves OR Government has become bigger
because the problems we face have become bigger.
* We need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems OR The free market can handle these problems without government being involved.
* The less government, the better OR There are more things
that government should be doing.

